cases of replacement of the ISC system are known in unrelated microbial lineages. These are Archamoebae and the breviate amoeba Pygsuia biforma, which have instead a bacterial nitrogenfixation (NIF) system and an archaeal SUF machinery, respectively [12, 13] . In both cases, Fe-S requiring enzymes (e.g.
[FeFe]-hydrogenase) have been retained along with the MROs where they function, in spite of the absence of the ISC system. Clearly, the situation is different in Monocercomonoides sp., which streamlined its mitochondrial function to the extreme -the loss of the organelle. So in such a complex array of organelles and functions, pinpointing an exact set of causes for mitochondrial loss is premature. It is likely that reductive mitochondrial evolution in Monocercomonoides sp. and MRO-containing lineages is not just the result of genetic opportunities (e.g.
LGTs) and functional redundancy. Other forces are at play, including chance, biological constraints due to specific lifestyles (e.g. energy requirement), as well as varying responses to environmental conditions.
More generally, such comparisons across the eukaryotic diversity vividly remind us, if need be, of the importance of discovery science. Our current understanding of eukaryote diversity and evolution (see [14] for a recent review) compels us to interpret the absence of mitochondrial organelles in Monocercomonoides sp. as a derived state. It would have been different 20 years ago, under the so-called Archezoa hypothesis, which postulated that some microbial eukaryote lineages diverged before the mitochondrial endosymbiosis, thus ancestrally lacking mitochondria [15] . If today we are confident in the secondarily amitochondriate nature of Monocercomonoides sp., it is because of the continuing discovery and functional characterization of a wide range of MROs in diverse lineages, as well as the improved resolution of the eukaryotic tree. The vast majority of eukaryotic diversity is composed of unicellular microbes -the protists -that, much like Monocercomonoides sp., are key to understanding the evolutionary paths that gave rise to this biodiversity. As shown here by Karnkowska and co-authors [5] , genome sequencing is a powerful tool that can shed light on extraordinary cellular and evolutionary processes in unexplored parts of the biosphere. Current research has barely scratched the surface of protist diversity; it is now time to dig deeper. [4] . Many failed to find evidence of neonatal imitation. However, because infancy research is very hard to do well, and each experiment involved a modest sample of babies -the average was around 30 -it was impossible to judge with certainty whether the positive or the negative results were reliable. Oostenbroek et al. [2] have overcome these problems by testing more than 100 infants, longitudinally at 1, 3, 6 and 9 weeks of age, in a cross-target procedure involving a wide range of targets. They recorded the frequencies of nine target actions -tongue protrusion, mouth opening, happy expressions, sad expressions, index finger protrusion, grasping, MMM sound, EEE sound, tongue clickwhile infants observed eleven movement stimuli -an adult performing each of the nine actions, and two object movements (spoon protruding through a tube and box opening). The results of this comprehensive study were wholly negative: in no case did the infants consistently perform a target action more often while observing the same action than while observing all of the alternative actions.
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Why Did It Take So Long?
In the sea of negative findings reported by Oostenbroek et al. [2] , one target action stood out. Tongue protrusion outperformed all of the other target actions. Infants protruded their tongues more often when observing tongue protrusion than when observing seven of the ten alternative actions [2] . In combination with the results of a meta-analysis in 1996 [5] , a recent review of research on neonatal imitation [4] and studies showing that newborns protrude their tongues in response to a range of arousing stimuli, such as flashing lights and lively music [6] , this helps to explain why it has taken so long to establish that human newborns do not imitate. Tongue protrusion, a target action that has been tested more than any other, was giving false hope. It is true that, if you look at a baby and stick out your tongue, the baby is likely to do it back. But the baby is not imitating your action. The baby is just excited by what she is seeing, and when babies are excited, they tend to stick out their tongues.
Because of this, the non-imitative tongue protrusion effect has both skewed the scientific data [5] and given many of us the false impression that, when leaning over a cradle, we have experienced neonatal imitation for ourselves (Figure 1) .
Factors in the sociology of science may also have delayed a study like that of Oostenbroek et al. [2] and thereby extended the period of uncertainty. Infancy research is not only hard but expensive. It requires dedicated testing facilities, large teams of researchers, and long hours of labour to get usable data. Therefore, as theories of cognitive and social development have become increasingly dependent on the assumption that newborns can imitate [7, 8] , negative results became harder to publish, and believers were more likely than sceptics to get a publication return on their research investment. It may not be incidental that Oostenbroek and colleagues are based in Australia rather than the United States, where commitment to neonatal imitation has been strongest, and that their study is published in Current Biology rather than a specialist journal, where stakeholder interests can have a stronger influence. Infants tend to stick out their tongues when they are aroused, and the sight of tongue protrusion arouses infants. This non-imitative effect has given the false impression that newborn humans can imitate. (Image courtesy of Jane and Elizabeth Leighton.)
What Goes and What Stays?
The study by Oostenbroek et al. [2] indicates that humans do not genetically inherit a neurocognitive mechanism for imitation. In principle, like secondary sexual characteristics, an imitation mechanism could be genetically inherited without being manifest in early infancy. This is logically possible, but, without evidence of neonatal imitation, it is an hypothesis without empirical support. It would be supported by evidence that imitative ability is highly genetically heritable, but in fact twin studies have shown that individual differences in imitation are associated predominantly with environmental rather than genetic factors [9] . While there is no convergent evidence that the capacity for imitation is inborn, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that humans learn to imitate through social interaction [4, 10] . For example, individual differences in associative learning ability at 1 month predict imitative performance at 9 months [11] , and at 7-9 months, neurophysiological responses indicative of imitation can be manipulated by sensorimotor training [12] .
The latest findings [2] on neonatal imitation also undermine the view that humans, and monkeys, genetically inherit a predisposition to develop mirror neurons; single cells that fire when a particular action, such as grasping, is observed, and when the same action is executed [13] . The leading evidence that mirror neurons are inborn, rather than products of associative learning, comes from the studies of neonatal imitation that Oostenbroek et al. [2] have shown to be unreliable [14, 15] .
In contrast, by establishing that the capacity to imitate depends on learning through social interaction, rather than an inborn mechanism, the findings of the new study [2] do not raise doubts about the importance of imitation in cognitive and social development. There is no reason why a socially constructed capacity for imitation should not play a key role in promoting cooperation [16] and cultural inheritance [17] , both directly and as a platform for the development of empathy, mind reading, language and other cognitive skills [18] . The findings reported by Oostenbroek et al. [2] call for new research on the origins rather than the consequences of imitation. When there is evidence that a neurocognitive mechanism is inborn, cognitive scientists tend to stop trying to explain how it develops and how it works [19] . Now it is clear that imitation is not 'in our genes', the challenge is to find out what kinds of social interaction are most important for the development of imitation, and exactly how the imitation mechanism operates.
At a broader level, the advance made by Oostenbroek et al. [2] encourages us to think more carefully about why human minds and human lives are so different from those of other animals. Many developmental and evolutionary psychologists assume that humans are 'special' because we genetically inherit a set of complex cognitive mechanisms, dedicated to functions such as language, mental time travel, cheater detection, face recognition, and theory of mind. Along with language, imitation was one of the first mechanisms to appear on this list. Now we know that imitation does not belong on the list -it does not depend on an inborn cognitive mechanismthere is renewed impetus for research testing alternative hypotheses. For example, at birth, human minds may be different from those of other animals only in subtle ways, giving us a tendency to stare at faces, an exaggerated sensitivity to social rewards, an extended capacity for learning, and a docile temperament [20] . But these subtle biases connect developing minds to the mature minds around them, and allow children to 'download' more complex cognitive processes through social interaction.
Imitation is a mighty oak of human cognition. Oostenbroek et al. [2] have confirmed that it grows from little acorns. Maybe the same is true of other trees in the cognitive forest.
